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BUILDING A MOAT AROUND THE IVORY
TOWER: PRICING POLICY IN THE
BUSINESS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
STEVEN R. SALBU*
Harvard College, as far as it educated at all, was a mild and liberal
school, which sent young men into the world with all they needed to
make respectable citizens, and something of what they wanted to
make useful ones. Leaders of men it never tried to make. Its ideals
were altogether different. The Unitarian clergy had given to the
College a character of moderation, balance, judgment, restraint,
what the French call mesure; excellent traits, which the College at-
tained with singular success, so that its graduates could commonly
be recognized by the stamp, but such a type of character rarely lent
itself to autobiography.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The colleges and universities2 that Americans attend are, like the
automobiles we purchase and drive, icons that create, reflect, and reinforce
the sense of who we are. While our automobiles impart merely an aura of
style or stylelessness, opulence or austerity, our colleges shape our develop-
ment both superficially and deeply, affecting what we know, what we be-
lieve, and the values which help to define the self and give meaning to our
lives. Henry Adams' description of Harvard in 1854 evokes the venerable
impression that a college education is above all else a process of quality.
Each good college and the education it provides has a unique character,
* Assistant Professor, Legal and Ethical Environment of Business, University of Texas at
Austin; B.A., Hofstra University; M.A., Dartmouth College; J.D., The College of William and
Mary; M.A., Ph.D., The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
1. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 54-55 (1918) (italics in original).
2. For the purposes of this article, the term "colleges" will be used as an inclusive and broad
reference to all institutions of higher education which provide four-year, undergraduate degrees.
This includes virtually all universities as well.
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which is the fiber of fierce loyalties, death-grip rivalry both academic and
athletic, and the donations and bequests which help to ensure the hegemony
of American higher education.
Colleges and universities establish policies that are meant to enhance the
better parts of their distinctive characters. St. John's College, distinguished
for its great books curriculum, offers one prescribed undergraduate course
of study, and allows no transfer credit, thereby maintaining uniformity and
cohesiveness of experience.3 Students at Brown University4 or Hampshire
College5 begin the process of higher education knowing that they have cho-
sen schools that provide much more flexibility, autonomy, and freedom in
their philosophical approaches to curriculum. Jesuit institutions like Mar-
quette6 and Georgetown7 still require the undergraduate study of religion,
ethics, or theology, reflecting the values they consider fundamental.
Schools also offer differing extracurricular environments, which tend to re-
flect the values and philosophies of the professors, administrators, and
trustees who shape their individual characters.'
As each college's individual choice of policies creates plurality and di-
versity among the many institutions from which students may choose, the
concerted policy of the industry of higher education9 has been to emphasize
differences in character while mitigating the effects of price in the market-
place. The ostensible ideals of wealthy institutions that have the resources
to indulge their highest principles are lofty ones, including choice of college
based on the best fit, and egalitarian access to their programs regardless of
financial status. Financial aid policies of colleges that have been relatively
unfettered by budgetary constraints tend to be fashioned to these ends.
As trends in higher education are often set by a small cadre of elite
institutions, recent questions regarding the soundness of financial aid policy
have focused on the practices of twenty-three colleges that are members of
3. See THE INSIDER'S GUIDE To THE COLLEGES 352-53 (The Yale Daily News ed., 1990).
4. Id. at 697-99.
5. Id. at 373-77.
6. Id. at 812-14.
7. Id. at 229-32.
8. A freshman attending Skidmore College will find neither a football team nor a system of
sororities and fraternities, experiencing an expressly or tacitly distinctive set of institutional values
and priorities. That student would face substantially different influences had he or she chosen to
attend Cornell University, for example.
9. The term "industry" is chosen advisedly here to refer to a cluster of institutions which
often choose to view themselves as charged with a public duty and, therefore, above or apart from
the directly profit-seeking business groups which are normally held to comprise an industry. The
decision to view higher education as a business is supported in section V of this article.
[Vol. 75:283
PRICING POLICY IN HIGHER EDUCATION
the "Overlap Group. °10 Until recently, the Group collaborated on financial
aid offers made to prospective freshmen. The Justice Department targeted
the colleges and other private, highly selective institutions' I for an antitrust
investigation. Members of the Overlap Group have consistently maintained
that collaboration regarding aid packages aptly focuses student decision-
making on the qualitative distinctions between and among institutions. 12
Uniformity of expected student contribution removes issues of cost and al-
lows the prospective freshman to assess and choose based solely on charac-
ter and attributes.
The removal or diminution of cost as a factor in student decision-mak-
ing is part of a larger philosophical shift in thinking about higher education.
Whereas, before the 1950s, scholarships were offered primarily to reward a
history of merit, financial aid is offered more frequently today on the basis
of need.13 Inherent in this shift has been an effort to make higher education
accessible across socio-economic, racial, and ethnic lines, and to provide
more egalitarian access to our finest institutions.
The Justice Department has contended that the Overlap Group's prac-
tices, regardless of motive, amount to unlawful price fixing.14 Some critics
of the member colleges suggest that the purported maintenance of purity in
the college decision process masks a truer intention to exploit students and
limit intergroup competition for the most able.1" Whether they impute
10. Members of the Overlap Group are: Amherst, Barnard, Bowdoin, Brown, Bryn Mawr,
Colby, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Middle-
bury, Mount Holyoke, Princeton, Pennsylvania, Smith, Trinity (Connecticut), Tufts, Vassar, Wel-
lesley, Wesleyan, Williams, and Yale.
11. The Justice Department has sought information from the following schools which are not
members of the Overlap Group: Agnes Scott, Albion, Antioch, Bates, Bennington, Chatham,
Wooster, Connecticut College, Converse, Denison, DePaul, Earlham, Goucher, Hamilton, Hol-
lins, Hope, Johns Hopkins, Kalamazoo, Kenyon, Mary Baldwin, Northwestern, Oberlin, Ohio
Wesleyan, Randolph-Macon Women's College, Sarah Lawrence, Skidmore, Stanford, Sweet
Briar, Chicago, Rochester, Southern California, Wabash, Wells, and Wheaton (Massachusetts).
12. See Scott Jaschik, Justice Department's Antitrust Investigation Focuses on Elite Colleges,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 1991, at Al. Jaschik states: "Colleges in the Overlap Group
have defended their activities. They say the comparisons insure that students receive comparable
aid packages from all the institutions that admit them, permitting the students to base their final
decisions on academic rather than financial reasons." Id. at A22.
13. In 1954, the College Board established the College Scholarship Service to help determine
in a centralized way the contributions which students could be expected to make toward their
educations, calculated on the basis of financial need. In tandem with the subsequent establish-
ment of the Overlap Group, the College Scholarship Service ushered in a new approach to pricing
philosophy in American higher education.
14. See Department of Justice Briefing re Ivy League Members and Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Collusion Activities Investigation, FED. NEWS SERV., May 22, 1991.
15. See, eg., Philip Benoit, Overlap Group Regrouping?, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at D4.
Benoit states: "[T]he institutions are not as concerned with the students as they would have us
1992]
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conspiratorial intent or merely document an epiphenomenal by-product,
those who disfavor collaboration insist that it creates more problems than it
solves.
II. TUITION AND FINANCIAL AID POLICY IN THE OVERLAP GROUP
The Overlap Group, which was created in 1956, held annual meetings
through 1990 for the purpose of comparing and adjusting financial aid of-
fers made to Overlap acceptees. 16 The express, overt function of these
meetings was to standardize the financial aid offers made to each acceptee
so that the financial investment he or she would be required to make across
member institutions would be virtually identical.
In August of 1989, approximately twenty colleges were contacted by the
Justice Department, which sought information about the way they set tui-
tion rates and calculated financial aid offers. During late 1989 and through-
out 1990, additional colleges were approached and similarly questioned,
bringing the total number of institutions under investigation to fifty-seven
by January of 199 1. " The Overlap Group met as usual during the spring of
1990,18 but disbanded its annual conference in 1991 under the mounting
pressure of the investigation. 19 By May of 1991, charges were brought by
the Justice Department against the eight Ivy League colleges2 0 and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.21 The complaint alleged that the
nine defendant schools had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act2 2 by
believe. What they are interested in is maintaining a high degree of control over the choices of the
top college applicants in the country and reducing financial aid expenses." Id
16. An Overlap acceptee is any applicant who was accepted at two or more of the member
institutions of the Overlap Group.
17. For a complete list of the fifty-seven schools investigated, see supra notes 10 and 11.
18. See Anthony Flint, Colleges Huddle Despite Price-Fixing Probe, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
28, 1990, at 55.
19. See Gary Putka, Colleges Cancel Aid Meeting Under Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12,
1991, at BI.
20. The members of the Ivy League, all members of the Overlap Group as well, are Brown,
Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Princeton, and Yale.
21. While other members of the Overlap Group, as well as nonmembers, were scrutinized for
alleged price-fixing activities, the Ivy League schools and M.I.T. were targeted in particular, possi-
bly because of their high profile and the specific programs they used in their approach to financial
aid. The schools allegedly agreed to provide aid on the basis of need but not on the basis of merit,
and shared a common financial aid formula called the "Ivy Needs Analysis" to calculate the
family's contribution, Like the other members of the Overlap Group, they compared the offers
made to Overlap acceptees and altered them in order to achieve a standard family contribution
expectation.
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
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agreeing and collaborating: (1) to fix the "family contribution" calculation
across member schools, and (2) to ban the granting of financial aid based on
merit.23 On May 22, 1991, the Ivy League schools entered a consent decree
in which they denied the allegations of price fixing but agreed to end future
cooperation in determining financial aid offers.24 The case is still pending
against the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which declined to join
the Ivy League colleges in the consent decree. Although the Justice De-
partment has taken no action against the remaining fourteen members of
the Overlap Group, the de facto disbanding in 1991 suggests the tacit con-
sent of these remaining institutions to the terms of the Ivy League
compromise.
In the sixty-day period during which the Justice Department heard
comments regarding the tentative consent decree, a former Princeton Uni-
versity student contended that the decree was inadequate to compensate
former students and remedy past practices, rendering it more difficult for
those harmed by the conspiracy to prove that the Overlap process violated
the law.25 The Justice Department responded that the decree was intended
to ameliorate future activity rather than compensate for past grievances.
The Department focused on developing sound public policy rather than
compensating or punishing existing infractions, and entered final judgment
approving the tentative consent decree on August 26, 1991.26
Potential private claimants were not alone in their criticism of the Jus-
tice Department's participation in the consent decree. Thomas Sowell,
economist and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, stated:
illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or con-
spiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
23. These charges are detailed in a Department of Justice Briefing by Richard Thornburgh,
U.S. Attorney General; James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division; and
Robert E. Bloch, Professions and Intellectual Property Section, Antitrust Division. See supra
note 14.
24. See Anthony DePalma, Ivy Universities Deny Price-Fixing But Agree to Avoid It in the
Future, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1991, at Al.
25. See DOJ Responds to Comments on Student Aid Decree, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1531, at 276 (Aug. 29, 1991).
26. 56 Fed. Reg. 42,068 (1991); see also United States v. Brown University, 772 F. Supp. 241
(E.D. Pa. 1991). The Justice Department's letter, written by Robert E. Bloch, Chief of the Profes-
sions and Intellectual Property Section,- states in part that the complaint's temporal language "is
related to the scope of our investigation and is legally sufficient for obtaining the broad injunctive
relief that was requested." DOJ Responds to Comments on Student Aid Decrees, supra note 25, at
276. The relief focuses on the future, "not the past." 1d.
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Any businessmen known to have engaged in such collusion could
expect widespread media denunciation as a certainty and antitrust
prosecutions as a high probability, with jail sentences being by no
means out of the question. Instead, the academic officials and insti-
tutions involved have been allowed to sign a consent decree, agree-
ing not to collude in the future. Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh's statement on the issue was the mildest kind of re-
proof, and the media have almost unanimously bought the colleges'
claim that their financial aid policies were designed to "benefit needy
students."27
There is substantial consensus among the Overlap school officials who
have spoken regarding past practices that the consent judgment was a prag-
matic strategic maneuver calculated to eliminate future costs of compliance
with the investigation.2" On May 23, 1991, the day on which the consent
judgment was entered, high-level representatives of Ivy League universities
continued to support publicly the practices in question.29 Parties to the
consent decree have suggested that they intend to seek congressional au-
thorization to resume Overlap Group activities,30 and the issue of both past
27. Thomas Sowell, Price Gouging, FORBES, June 24, 1991, at 109, 109.
28. At least temporarily, a consortium of 32 colleges, calling itself the Consortium on Financ-
ing Higher Education, is trying to avoid further entanglement with the Justice Department. The
Consortium colleges, among the nation's most expensive, have issued guidelines to help define
appropriate behavior within the spirit of the May 23 consent decree. In particular, the guidelines
allow only historical discussion of tuition, faculty salaries, and financial aid awards and policies.
Consortium meetings will be subject to prior legal review to determine whether potentially anti-
competitive behavior exists and, if so, to remove it from the agenda. See Robin Wilson, Consor-
tium of 32 Colleges Issues Guidelines on Limits to Discussion of Student Aid and Related Issues,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 30, 1991, at A35.
29. See Scott Jaschik, Ivy League Agrees to End Collaboration on Financial Aid, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., May 29, 1991, at A18 ("[m]ost officials of Overlap institutions said that the
organization had been helpful to them and to students and that the Ivy League universities had
signed the agreement mainly to avoid an expensive legal battle."). Daniel Steiner, vice president
and general counsel at Harvard, stated that "[o]ur practices served the good social purposes of
making sure that a limited amount of financial funds went to the neediest students." DePalma,
supra note 24, at B13. The denial of price-fixing activity which accompanied the Ivy Schools'
reluctant participation in the consent judgment was the force behind the refusal of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology to join the settlement. Mark Wrighton, provost at M.I.T., stated:
"We do not believe that our processes, including the overlap meetings, violated antitrust laws."
Id. Benno Schmidt, Jr., president of Yale, characterized Attorney General Thornburgh's allega-
tions as "grossly unfair," and Princeton president Harold Shapiro argued that "[a]wards in excess
of need either divert resources from needy students or require an increase in revenues or reduc-
tions in other programs to support aid above the level of need." Id.
30. See Ways & Means Private-College Lobbyists are Trying to Win Congressional Support for
Legislation that Would Allow them to Establish a Uniform Financial-aid Policy, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Oct. 16, 1991, at A41. The article states that "[t]he proposal is being pushed by Princeton
University and other private institutions to restore their right to meet and set policies jointly." Id.;
see also Jaschik, supra note 29, at A19 (stating that Columbia University issued a statement at the
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and future practices is still open with regard to M.I.T. and the fourteen
other Overlap institutions.
The May 23 consent of the Ivy League institutions was a reluctant but
strategically calculated maneuver. Their consideration of efforts to lobby
Congress for special dispensation to reconvene their meetings indicates that
the merits of the Overlap issue remain unsettled in the eyes of some of the
most prestigious participants. M.I.T.'s refusal to participate in the consent
judgment, and the omission from litigation of other Overlap and non-Over-
lap subjects of the investigation, confirm that the question of collaboration
is still alive. Moreover, private actions for damages based on past practices
will require some final determination of the legitimacy of prior Overlap
Group behavior under the antitrust laws.3'
III. REGULATION OF PRICE FIXING IN SPECIAL INDUSTRIES
The Justice Department's suit against the Ivy League schools and
M.I.T. alleged that the schools violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits every "contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce .... ,,32 Allegations of horizontal price fixing tradi-
tionally fall within this section, and a finding of price-fixing activity is con-
sidered to be a per se violation for which no rationale or explanation will
serve as a defense.33 While it has been suggested that the per se standard
has recently been eroded and, on occasion, supplanted by a "qualified per
se" analysis, clear instances of price fixing are still adjudicated under ordi-
nary circumstances without reference to the "Rule of Reason" or consider-
ation of ameliorating circumstances.3 4 Several recent cases suggest,
however, that Rule of Reason analysis may apply to special classes of de-
fendants. Under Rule of Reason analysis, the court weighs the costs and
time of entering the consent decree, "that it would ask Congress to amend antitrust laws to allow
colleges to return to the [pre-consent decree] financial-aid policies").
31. The first private suit for damages was filed in 1989, during the earliest phase of the Justice
Department investigation. The merits of the case have not yet been decided, as the district court
recently denied defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper
venue. Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
33. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (in which Justice
Douglas stated that "a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depress-
ing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity.., is illegal per se."); cf Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
34. See David P. Kreisler, Note, The Antitrust Laws and the Overlap Group: Were Colleges
and Universities the Robber Barons of the 1980s? 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 217, 227 (1991) (citing
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). While the Court applied the
Rule of Reason in NCAA, the behavior at issue was not direct price fixing, but rather an agree-
ment to restrict the televising of member teams' games.
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benefits of the contested behavior to determine whether the economic con-
sequences thereof are ultimately harmful or beneficial."
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,36 the Supreme Court rejected the ar-
gument that the Sherman Act does not apply to learned professions. The
Court noted that the per se scrutiny ordinarily applied in cases of horizontal
price fixing may be relaxed with regard to this group, observing that busi-
ness and the professions are not automatically interchangeable, and that the
"public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of
the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently."37 Because the
Court did not explicitly state the nature of such differentiated analysis, and
because the Court ultimately found the minimum fee agreements of the law-
yer defendants unlawful, the degree to which application of the per se rule
may be tempered as applied to nonbusiness entities remains speculative.
Cases following Goldfarb have not adequately clarified confusion regarding
the standard applied to professions.
The Supreme Court applied the Rule of Reason to alleged price fixing
activity in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States."5
The Court noted, however, that Goldfarb did not "fashion[] a broad exemp-
tion under the Rule of Reason for learned professions."39 While the Court
admitted that "professional services may differ significantly from other
business services, and, accordingly, the nature of the competition in such
services may vary,"' it refused to expand the Rule of Reason to "support a
defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable."'"
Thus, while the Rule of Reason may be applied to learned professions, it
cannot be stretched to support an anticompetitive policy. "Reasonable"
price fixing is entirely a function of net procompetitive effect. Noneconomic
ends, however rational, cannot render a price fixing scheme acceptable
under the Rule of Reason.42 Given the difficulty of establishing competitive
35. The Rule of Reason, as noted herein, is not traditionally applied to price-fixing activity,
but was developed in the realm of trust-busting litigation, essentially differentiating between good
trusts and bad trusts. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Because the rule
was developed in response to monopolization rather than price fixing, and because price fixing is
commonly held to be strictly illegal under the per se rule, it remains unclear how price fixing is
evaluated under Rule of Reason analysis.
36. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37. Id. at 788 n.17.
38. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
39. Id. at 696.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
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advantages conferred upon the market by price fixing, application of the
Rule of Reason is deceptive in these cases. Since the ability to prove
procompetitive net effect is extremely rare, Rule of Reason scrutiny is close
to per se analysis in degree of stringency.43
Because of factual similarities, these limitations are germane to the case
against the Overlap Group. In Society of Engineers, the practice in question
was an agreement among engineers to foreclose competitive bidding for
their services by refusing to discuss prices with potential clients until after
negotiations." For ostensibly ethical reasons, including maintenance of
quality and safety, the engineers, like the college administrators in the
Overlap Group, created a policy which eliminated a customer's ability to
consider variations in price among bids received.45
The Court noted that the Rule of Reason does not permit an argument
that "because of the special characteristics of a particular industry, monop-
olistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce than competi-
tion."'  The decision in Society of Engineers also implies that it is
unreasonable per se to suggest that anticompetitive behavior will enhance
quality or safety.4 7 These restrictions hint that the application of the Rule
of Reason will result in a finding that price-fixing behavior is unreasonable
under all but the most extraordinary circumstances,48 again suggesting that
the distinction between the per se and Rule of Reason approaches is more a
technicality than a meaningful difference.
43. This phenomenon is not as peculiar as it may sound, given the original determination in
Socony- Vacuum that price-fixing activity is per se anticompetitive. The largely illusory distinction
between per se and Rule of Reason approaches to price fixing reflects a spurious departure from
Socony-Vacuum's accurate assessment that price fixing is uniformly bad for markets.
44. See Society of Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692.
45. Id at 693-94.
46. Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
47. The court stated:
Petitioner's ban on competitive bidding prevents all customers from making price com-
parisons in the initial selection of an engineer, and imposes the Society's views of the costs
and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace. It is this restraint that must be
justified under the Rule of Reason, and petitioner's attempt to do so on the basis of the
potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the ethics of its profession
is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will pro-
duce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.
Id. at 695.
48. One scholar has suggested that the test in Society of Engineers requires a showing that the
alleged behavior has procompetitive justifications, as well as proof that the actions comprise the
least restrictive alternative. See Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be
Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 206, 225 (1990).
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Regarding colleges specifically, the court in Marjorie Webster Junior
College Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools., Inc.49
stated that the Sherman Act was "'tailored... for the business world,' not
for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned profes-
sions."50 The degree to which per se scrutiny is relaxed, and the extent to
which extenuating factors are examined, should therefore depend on the
relatively commercial or noncommercial nature of the Overlap Group pol-
icy at issue. The arguments in Section V support a conclusion that the
fixing of aid offers is in essence a commercial aspect of higher education,
subject to the full scrutiny of the Sherman Act.
What comprises the distinction between full scrutiny and levels of re-
laxed scrutiny under the Sherman Act remains uncertain. It is difficult to
discern a consistent analytical framework for evaluating price fixing among
professional and public service entities. The confusion relates more to no-
menclature than substance, however, as judges and scholars apply the labels
of per se, qualified per se, and Rule of Reason arbitrarily in a manner that
disguises a surprising degree of consistency in approach. As the Supreme
Court noted in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,"1 "the Sher-
man Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one
uniform rule applicable to all industries alike."52 In a similar vein, the
Court has stated that the Rule of Reason places a "heavy burden" on de-
fendants to justify anti-competitive behavior under circumstances held to
justify the relinquishment of per se scrutiny.5"
Notwithstanding the muddled state of the law regarding both the degree
of scrutiny properly applied and the precise meaning of each level of scru-
tiny, it appears that the Overlap Group faces significant hurdles in defend-
ing its behavior. In particular, relaxation of per se analysis in instances of
horizontal market restrictions is granted only if such restrictions are "essen-
tial if the product is to be available at all." 4 Given the thousands of col-
leges that operate successfully without resorting to the behavior of the
Overlap Group, it is highly unlikely that this hurdle can be met. Moreover,
under the remote chance that the relaxed scrutiny of the Rule of Reason
were granted, the heightened defensive burden established by the Supreme
Court renders such application very similar to per se analysis.
49. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (omission in original) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970).
50. Id. at 654.
51. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
52. Id. at 346 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150, 221-22 (1940)).
53. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
54. Id. at 100.
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In particular, the schools would be required to show that their policies
have not resulted in a net reduction of competition among institutions of
higher education. To do so, they must demonstrate either that they do not
wield significant market power as a group, or alternately that although they
do wield such power, their activities are in fact procompetitive.55 While the
Overlap schools are only twenty-three out of thousands of two-and-four
year institutions of higher education, they tend to compete for students
predominantly against each other and a handful of schools outside the
group.5 6 This phenomenon has been explained by Richmond, who con-
tends that "'[n]ame' private institutions ... constitute a separate market.
They are uniquely attractive to prospective students and their parents; com-
peting universities, including public institutions and lesser-known private
colleges, are unable to attract this student population." 7 That the cadre of
schools in the Overlap Group forms a market distinct from the masses of
other colleges is not surprising given the opportunities associated with the
elite credentials they confer. Chief executive officers of the "Business Week
1000" are most likely to have received their undergraduate training from
(in descending order) Princeton, Yale, and Harvard, all members of both
the Ivy League and the Overlap Group. 8 Because salaries appurtenant to
these positions are stunningly high,59 and because the advantages prestige
degrees obtain within many career paths, efforts of the Overlap Group to
close ranks and inflate tuition are unlikely to be countered by the smaller
fees charged by state schools or less prestigious private schools.
The determination of the relevant market in which to assess market
power is a function of cross-elasticity of demand.' The Fiske Guide to Col-
leges, consistently evincing substantial and relatively exclusive overlap of
application among the collaborating Overlap Group schools, 61 suggests that
the borders of demand are virtually restricted to these elite institutions.
55. For analysis of this line of reasoning, see Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and
Tuition Price-Fixing: An Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. & U.L. 271, 299-301 (1991).
56. The 1989 Fiske Guide to Colleges, among a small collection of college guides used by
prospective students, lists what it calls "Overlaps," those schools to which applicants for each
listed school are most likely to apply. See EDWARD B. FISKE, THE FISKE GUIDE TO COLLEGES
(1989). Amherst's overlaps, for example, are listed as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, and
Brown. Id. at 28. The University of Pennsylvania's lists its overlaps as Cornell, Brown, Duke,
Princeton, and Stanford. Id. at 558. Overlaps for Middlebury College are Darmouth, Williams,
Brown, Bowdoin, and Amherst. Id. at 471.
57. Richmond, supra note 55, at 299.
58. See Monica Roman et al., A Portrait of the Boss, Bus. WK., Nov. 25, 1991, at 180, 180.
59. See id. The average Business Week 1000 chief executive officer's base salary and bonus in
1990 was $868,000.
60. See generally United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
61. See generally FISKE, supra note 56.
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This evidence suggests that the Group itself is the relevant market, and that
the Group's market power is formidable.6 2
Under per se analysis, the collaborative behavior of the Overlap Group
is price fixing behavior in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Even
rigorous Rule of Reason analysis,6 3 assuming for the moment that the Over-
lap events should be governed by that standard, requires that the collabora-
tors justify their behavior by demonstrating its essentially procompetitive
effects on the market.' 4 The discussion in Section IV, addressing the bene-
fits and disadvantages of collaboration, reveals that the advantages sought
by the Overlap Group are consistently either noncompetitive65 or ideologi-
cally anti-competitive.6 6 Even under the theoretically more forgiving Rule
of Reason analysis, noncompetitive goals should be achieved under less re-
strictive alternatives, i.e., using policies that achieve legitimate and lawful
goals without unnecessarily burdening market competition. Anti-competi-
tive objectives, yielding anti-competitive results, fail by definition the test
requiring net procompetitive effect on the marketplace. Because the dy-
namics discussed in Section IV reflect anti-competitive and unduly burden-
some noncompetitive market influence, the behavior of the Overlap Group
is illegal under either per se or Rule of Reason analysis.
In Section IV, the effects of Overlap activity, both beneficial and disad-
vantageous, are discussed in detail. Under the preceding analysis of current
62. Non-Overlap schools under Justice Department investigation, such as Stanford, generally
charge tuition rates very similar to those charged by Overlap schools, suggesting the possibility of
informal price fixing, or formal price fixing through a mechanism other than the Group itself.
There are one or two institutions not under investigation whose relatively low tuition rates and
independent aid assessments form the exception that proves the rule. Rice University, for exam-
ple, is a very heavily endowed university whose tuition is relatively low, and whose overlap
schools are listed in the Fiske Guide as Stanford, Princeton, University of Texas at Austin, Texas
A & M, and Harvard. FISKE, supra note 56, at 597. Likewise, Deep Springs College attracts a
freshman class whose overlaps in application include Harvard, Yale, and Cornell. Id. at 241
(Deep Springs is a two-year, tuition-free college whose graduates are primarily fed back to Over-
lap Group schools for their junior and senior years of college). These exceptional institutions, each
of which is small and extremely competitive in admissions policy, do little to mitigate the
stronghold of the Overlap Schools on the pools of highly competitive college applicants.
63. By "rigorous" Rule of Reason analysis, I suggest a standard which gives the Overlap
Group the greatest benefit of the doubt possible in evaluating alleged price-fixing behavior. Nor-
mally the standard is labelled "qualified per se," nomenclature that indicates a standard closer to
the per se standard than to the more lenient Rule of Reason.
64. See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Court stated: "The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
Id.
65. "Noncompetitive" advantages are those that are unrelated to market competition.
66. "Anti-competitive" advantages are those that represent a policy decision to reduce
competition.
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antitrust law and underlying policy, this balance of interest weighs against
the Overlap Group practices, suggesting illegal price fixing has occurred
even under Rule of Reason scrutiny. Moreover, the factors in Section IV
suggest that congressional responsiveness to lobbying efforts aimed at creat-
ing an exception for institutions of higher education would result in poor
public policy which ignores the economic functions of colleges in modem
American society.
IV. THE BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES OF COLLABORATION
The Overlap Group contends that its meetings, held in order to fix and
unify the expected financial contributions of each prospective student and
family, served positive functions for the individuals who fell within the sys-
tem and for society at large. The Justice Department insisted that the prac-
tices of the Overlap Group constituted illegal price fixing under the
Sherman Act, and were therefore unlawful and contrary to public policy.
The specific merits on each side are represented below in a discussion that
addresses the major policy issues concerning the Overlap Group in the form
of points made by, or available to, the Overlap Group (represented by let-
ter) and counterpoints made by, or available to, the Justice Department and
other critics (represented by letter prime).67
A. Collaboration Allows Students to Choose a College on the Basis of Its
Distinctive Qualitative Merits Rather Than on the Basis of Cost.
The argument most frequently raised to defend collaboration is one that
seeks purity of education, untainted by worldly but inevitable concerns.
Uniform awards68 remove the element of price as a factor in selecting a
school, leaving students free to choose based on the important qualitative
67. I discuss points made by "or available to" each group because not all of the arguments
made herein have been posited by the groups that might benefit from their use. Some of the
reasoning contained in this section cannot be attributed to either Overlap schools or the Justice
Department. Reasoning that may be attributable to members of either group is annotated to
reflect such attribution; nonannotated reasoning represents my efforts to discuss the merits of the
controversy as thoroughly as possible, and cannot be attributed to the parties involved.
68. In writings concerning the Overlap Group and its activities, phrases such as "uniform
awards" are often used because such terms are concise. This term and similar terms can lead to
confusion, however, because they are technically an inaccurate description of the goals of the
Overlap Group. The aim of collaboration is not to create identical awards, but rather to create
awards that will result in identical expected family contributions. For example, if College A
charges $14,000 annual tuition, and College B charges $13,000 annual tuition, and the colleges
agree that the family contribution should be $9,000, College A would award $5,000 and College B
would award $4,000, rendering the financial choices of the applicant identical. This phenomenon
will be referred to herein as the creation of "uniform awards," even though the aid figures
awarded by different colleges in the Group are usually somewhat different.
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differences of size, environment, curriculum, orientation toward teaching or
research, departmental strengths, and overall compatibility with student
goals and expectations.
Because cost is a less compelling factor for wealthy students than for
poor students, administrators contend that the elimination of Overlap activ-
ity will disproportionately hurt needy students.69 Under the new competi-
tive scheme, students in wealthy public school districts and at expensive
private institutions will be the ones most likely to negotiate financial aid
offers under the tutelage of the best guidance counselors money can buy.
Advantaged students who may not need financial aid to make a choice on
the basis of nonfinancial characteristics will receive a greater proportion of
existing funds, thereby reducing aid to disadvantaged students who will be
forced to make that college decision which mitigates the augmented finan-
cial stress. Since the price elasticity of demand will be greatest for these
needier students, they are the most vulnerable to monetary bargaining pres-
sures. After the consent decree, wealthy students will decide which college
to attend as they always have-on the basis of the relative merits of the
schools under consideration. As they do so with the added benefit of merit
scholarships and heightened negotiating power, shrinking pools of aid avail-
able to the middle and lower classes will force an increased number of less
fortunate students to choose the only college they can afford.70
A. 1. Collaboration Forces Students to Choose a College Based on
Characteristics other Than Cost.
Assuming only the most benevolent intentions on the part of college
administrators,71 removal of cost issues from the college decision is harm-
ful. Neoclassical economic theory and classically liberal notions of political
69. See Jaschik, supra note 29. Michael S. McPherson, co-director of the Williams College
Project on the Economics of Higher Education, states that while the disbanding of the Overlap
Group "will help some students and hurt others. On the whole, the students who will do worst
will be the neediest. The extremely bright kids who already have very promising futures will have
even better futures." Id. at A19.
70. The problem of access to top private colleges is exacerbated as state institutions are forced
to meet budget constraints in the 1990s by reducing enrollment, a phenomenon believed by many
administrators to have a disproportionately harmful effect on minority and low-income students.
See Goldie Blumenstyk, Public Colleges, Battered by Recession, Turn Away Thousands of Students,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 1991, at Al.
71. This assumption is made to give the entire benefit of the doubt to the college administra-
tors' perspective on the Overlap Group issue. It would be naive to believe that college administra-
tors are any more immune to opportunistic behavior than other groups of professionals.
Undoubtedly some administrators, notwithstanding public relations proclamations to the con-
trary, embrace the practices of the Overlap Group as a means of augmenting market power and
gaining control over the pricing mechanism.
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freedom support the greatest possible degree of consumer choice in making
purchases in capital markets. 2 With tuition and fees alorie approaching
$20,000 a year at the most expensive private institutions,73 arguments sug-
gesting that college education is not a market transaction appear specious at
best and absurdly self-serving at worst. Applied to the question of which
college to attend, the basic principles of political economy which support
our system of capitalism mandate that comparative pricing be included
within the consumer's purchasing decision.74 To remove pricing from the
student's purview, even in the name of academic purity, the Overlap Group
paternalistically channels all consumers into a philosophy of education that
they may not independently support if given a choice. Many students, for
many reasons, would prefer to choose from top schools based on price. Stu-
dent A may believe that quality distinctions among the schools are largely
illusory, in which instance the determining factor should ideally be price.
Student B may believe that the Overlap schools do differ in distinctive,
qualitative ways, but she would still prefer to make her decision based on
price. Student C might believe that price should not be a factor in deter-
mining among schools. She will retain the option to choose based on
noneconomic factors, to the extent that she is fiscally able. For each of
these students, Overlap Group practices remove the option of considering
price, whereas prohibition of collaboration restores it. If one premise be-
hind free markets is the maintenance and optimization of individual free-
doms, then the fixing of financial aid offers is harmful as a derogation of
those freedoms.
Collaboration has effects on individual students beyond the theoretical
impingement upon political and economic freedoms. Students may find
that they are unable to attend any of the prestigious schools within the
Overlap Group because aid offers are less generous than the best aid offer
72. See CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS PROCEEDINGS OF A CON-
FERENCE IN HONOR OF MILTON FRIEDMAN 7-36 (Richard T. Selden ed., 1975). Milton Fried-
man's classical defense of neoclassical economics contends that unfettered markets in which
consumers maintain the highest possible degree of choice are inextricably joined to the broader
maintenance of individual freedom within our socio-economic system.
73. In the academic year 1990-91, 73 private four-year colleges charged tuition and fees in
excess of $15,000 per annum. The average tuition and fees charges at these schools was $16,161.
The schools represent 12.9 percent of total enrollment at private colleges. Tuition and fees for
1990-91 at Bennington College, traditionally the most expensive in the nation, was $17,790. See
Fact File: 1991-92 Tuition and Fees at More Than 2,900 Colleges and Universities, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 23, 1991, at A31-36.
74. Thornburgh stated the rationale behind this assertion succinctly: "The defendants con-
spired to eliminate cost competition as a factor in choosing a college. The choice of whether to
consider price when picking a school belongs to parents and students, not the college or univer-
sity." See supra note 14.
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would have been in the absence of collaboration.75 Thornburgh has stated
that "[a] major potential negative effect of the collusion ... is that students
may have been deprived of the opportunity to attend the defendants' school
of their choice, because they were not offered as much aid as they would
have been in the absence of the conspiracy."76 Students A, B, and C alike
are apt to become victims of this scenario, as idiosyncratically generous of-
fers are brought in line with more conservative offers. 7
B. Collaboration is not Harmful within the Public Service Context of
Higher Education, which is Outside the Scope of Profit-Seeking Behavior.
Members of the Overlap Group insist that there is a poor fit in the appli-
cation of antitrust laws to institutions of higher education. Their assertions
tend to be represented in quotations within the popular press, and are there-
fore of necessity generalized and not highly developed. These statements
tend to focus on the profit motive of business, maintaining that colleges do
not seek profits and are therefore beyond the regulatory scope of the Sher-
man Act.78
Several arguments are implicit in these generic press-release statements.
Colleges have no motives to fix prices at artificially high levels. Colleges
have no shareholders, distribute no dividends, and neither appreciate nor
depreciate in value within any marketplace of public purchases and sales.
While colleges operate with budgets and endowments, their financial aid
programs are the antithesis of profit-they amount to the public disburse-
ment of significant levels of institutional resources. 79 Therefore, there is no
benefit to be gained by prohibiting the collaboration of colleges with regard
to financial aid. The Sherman Act was passed during the Progressive era of
reform in order to stem pernicious and predatory practices of emerging
75. While the Overlap Group may argue that collaboration is intended to avoid just such an
eventuality by meeting the financial need of all applicants, many aspiring students find themselves
unable to attend prestigious private schools because of the practical discrepancy between the uni-
form, official assessment of need and actual need.
76. See supra note 14.
77. Given the absence of competition among the elite schools comprising the Overlap Group,
there are economic incentives to collaborate downward rather than upward in determining finan-
cial aid. While Student C might benefit from the realignment of low aid offers to meet the higher
aid offers of other schools, budget-conscious administrators have little motivation to err in favor of
generosity.
78. Francis Oakley, president of Williams College, has been quoted as saying: "The Sherman
Act speaks to the danger of restraint of trade... But we do not exist for trade. We have no desire
to turn profits; we exist, indeed, to give profits away." Nicolaus Mills, Are Colleges Fixing Prices?,
NATION, Mar. 19, 1990, at 379, 379 (omission in original).
79. Id.
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trusts and combinations."0 Given the disparity between institutions of
higher education and the kinds of organizations that were meant to be cov-
ered by the law, application of the Sherman Act to colleges will bear no
social or economic benefits. There are costs in terms of both the strategic
planning of individual institutions and the industrial policy making of all
colleges collectively as they attempt to meet the public's needs using scarce
resources. It is argued that collaboration' which benefits the cooperating
organization should be preserved since collaboration costs society nothing.
Colleges face logistical and financial difficulties in pursuing their legitimate
strategic goals and providing their services to the public. Cooperative be-
havior can reduce costs by eliminating redundancies of procedure and es-
tablishing a reliable source of information which otherwise can be expensive
and difficult to obtain.8" Apart from its strategic role in hampering institu-
tional efforts to implement individual missions, application of antitrust laws
to colleges retards the development of sound and cohesive educational in-
dustrial policy, which can help American institutions retain an advanta-
geous position relative to foreign institutions.2 The maintenance of the
highest quality American education in turn supports the infrastructure nec-
essary to preserve and enhance our social and economic roles within the
global community.
80. For a discussion of the evils at which the developing antitrust laws were aimed during the
early part of the Twentieth Century, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVE-
MENT, 1900-1915, at 141-44 (1986) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt on trusts and big business).
81. See Steven R. Salbu, Joint Venture Contracts as Strategic Tools, 25 IND. L. REV. 397, 423
(1991). In this Article, I contend that enhanced learning and assimilation of new information are
strategic variables which can be affected by the nature of collaborative arrangements.
82. Proposals favoring industrial policy have applied mostly to profit-oriented businesses,
particularly as American companies attempt to compete with Japanese companies. Proponents of
industrial policy suggest that centralized planning and support for target industries creates signifi-
cant strategic advantages for those industries as they compete in the global market against more
traditionally constrained players within strict laissez-faire political economies. By analogy, it can
be argued that these advantages should apply as well to institutions of higher education seeking to
maintain the highest level of quality in a global context. For a discussion of the concept of indus-
trial policy, see Robert B. Reich, Why the U.S. Needs an Industrial Policy, 60 HARV. Bus. REV.
74 (1982).
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B. L Within Any Competitive Industry or Market Segment,
Collaboration on Price Will Tend to Reduce Competition Among Sellers,
Discouraging Price Containment and Quality Enhancement.
Questions of price fixing, like all antitrust issues, are best evaluated in
terms of consumer welfare.13 In competitive markets, consumer interests
are advanced by policies that maintain price competition and help reduce
the power disparity between individual buyers and corporate giants.8 4 Ac-
cordingly, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "the Sherman
Law and the judicial decisions interpreting it are based upon the assump-
tion that the public interest is best protected from the evils of ... price
control by the maintenance of competition."85
Without the benefit of collaboration, colleges from the late 1970s
through the early 1990s would have faced more intense competition for de-
clining numbers of high school graduates.86 Such competition should be
expected to result in favorable trends for student consumers, manifested in
intensified price and quality competition.87 Collusion among the colleges
has allowed them to counter these otherwise naturally occurring market
83. For a detailed discussion of this assertion, see Charles F. Rule & David L. Meyer, An
Antitrust Enforcement Policy to Maximize the Economic Wealth of All Consumers, 33 ANTITRUST
BULL. 677, 693-700 (1988).
84. Business historian Alfred Chandler has documented the tremendous growth in size and
power of corporations in modem America. He contends that the planning mechanisms of these
large businesses have replaced Adam Smith's invisible hand with the "visible hand," capable of
unilaterally affecting those market factors which Smith contended would modulate themselves
without recourse to government regulation. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISI-
BLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). As university
endowments continue to grow, the disparity of power observed by Chandler increasingly charac-
terizes higher education as well as profit-seeking industrial organizations. See generally CARL
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1959) (suggesting that market power is harmful to competition, therefore public policies should
act to reduce such power).
85. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1926).
86. Absolute numbers of high school graduates have been declining since 1978. See Michele
N-K Collison, Acceptance Rate Up for This Semester at Many Colleges, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Nov. 27, 1991, at Al. Projected private, four-year college enrollment for the early 1990s is as
follows: 2,773,000 (1991); 2,766,000 (1992); 2,757,000 (1993); 2,747,000 (1994). Projections of
College Enrollment, 1991-2001, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. ALMANAC, Aug. 28, 1991, at 14.
87. Chicago School economist Richard Posner notes that:
[B]y 1898 the Supreme Court had firmly established the principle, immensely important to
the development of a sound antitrust policy, that cartels and other price-fixing agreements
were illegal regardless of the "reasonableness" of the price fixed. Consistent with the eco-
nomic analysis of the monopoly problem, the Court decided that collusive pricing was
inefficient and should be forbidden; the reasonable price was the competitive price.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 24 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
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forces, conferring upon them a degree of immunity from pressures to re-
duce either absolute tuition charges or, at the very least, the rapid rate of
their annual increase. The counter-intuitive continuity of inflation in higher
education under conditions of potentially reduced demand is theoretically a
function of the institutional market power generated through price fixing.
While disincentives to innovate and improve quality are less quantifiable
than statistics indicating rising tuition rates, the logic of competitive mar-
kets suggests that those institutions which insulate themselves from the
need to compete on price will also find less necessity to compete on other
grounds, including the quality factors which they claim to be protecting
through their policies.
Thomas Sowell contends that the financial aid policies of the Overlap
Group are duplicitous in their claim of trying to help needy students. Ac-
cording to this argument, the colleges maintain highly over-inflated list
prices and offer standardized discounts to each student in order to charge
the highest that the market will bear, bleeding both families and sources of
government support.88 Likewise, Ian Ayres has maintained that this prac-
tice is "no different from a horizontal agreement among manufacturers to
fix uniform discounts for their products." 9 Given the market power to
inflate prices artificially and the market pressures to do so under increasing
or even normal budget pressures, college administrators are likely to raise
prices, either consciously or unintentionally, beyond what would be the
equilibrium price under more normal competitive conditions.
C. Collaboration Helps Colleges to Assess Financial Need More
Accurately, Improving the Rational Allocation of Scarce Resources.
In a complex society with increasingly sophisticated financial and eco-
nomic arrangements, the task of assessing student need has become more
difficult. College officials have evoked the complexity of making rational
financial aid decisions to defend the joint efforts of the Overlap Group,9"
implicitly grounding their arguments in basic decision theory which sug-
88. See Sowell, supra note 27.
89. Ian Ayres, Colleges in Collusion, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1989, at 19, 19.
90. See Robin Wilson, Collapse of Student-Aid Talks Among Top Colleges Leaves Big Gaps in
Offers; an Advisor Sees 'Chaos,' CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 11, 1991, at Al. Wilson states:
"Aid officers at the Overlap institutions do not comment on individual students' packages. But
they say that assessing a student's financial need frequently involves a complicated series of calcu-
lations, so it is possible to come up with several determinations of how much a family can afford to
pay." Id. at A39. The article quotes Walter H. Moulton, director of student aid at Bowdoin
College, as stating: "Economic life in the U.S. has become very complicated. Consequently, mea-
suring ability to pay in middle-and upper-income families has become an art form of vast dimen-
sions." Id.
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gests that quality of information, interpretation, and resolution can improve
with group efforts and a larger population of decision makers. Classical
decision theory contends that human beings are utility optimizers who seek
to make the best choice under the circumstances.91 They define the prob-
lem at hand, seek alternative responses, rank the responses on the basis of
cost-benefit analysis, and choose the optimal course of action. Behavioral
decision theory has noted that the intended rationality of decision makers is
often thwarted by cognitive and practical bounds, rendering the process
more an exercise in finding an acceptable or "satisfying" alternative. Given
this tendency of humans to fall short of ideal rationality, an increase in the
size of the group of evaluators can potentially enhance the quality of the
perception of the problem, the number and effectiveness of alternatives
found, the accuracy of rankings, and the ultimate decision itself.92 Ob-
taining the most accurate assessment of need is vital in a system that at-
tempts to make quality education affordable to everyone, since offers that
are inflated beyond actual need deplete an already inadequate pool of re-
sources, lowering the awards made to persons who are marginally unable to
attend expensive institutions.93
Implicit in this defense is the institutions' assertion of autonomy in de-
veloping objectives and goals. Members of the Overlap Group share a phi-
losophy that financial aid policies should attempt to make higher education
accessible to all, regardless of need. To do this under conditions of scarcity,
it is imperative that assessments of need be accurate, thereby avoiding
awards inadvertently in excess of true need.
The colleges also contend that prohibiting merit awards across institu-
tions is necessary to implement goals of universal access. They reason that
to maintain sufficient funds to meet the financial needs of all potential stu-
dents, bidding on the basis of characteristics other than need must be cur-
tailed.94 If the Ivy League's consensus not to offer merit awards is banned
91. For a discussion of classical decision theory, see generally JOHN DEWEY, How WE
THINK (1910).
92. This potential improvement in decision making by larger groups may be curtailed by the
phenomenon of "groupthink," a tendency within groups toward cohesive and conforming behav-
ior. See JAMES L. BOWDITCH & ANTHONY F. BUONO, A PRIMER ON ORGANIZATIONAL BE-
HAVIOR 99-100, 133-35 (2d ed. 1990).
93. See Susan Dodge, Overlap Group Makes Aid Process Fairer, Targets of Inquiry Argue,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 11, 1989, at A32. According to Dodge, "officials say the group's
work has helped them avoid bidding wars over students. Such wars would result in less aid for
some students ... because colleges would be forced to offer more money to some students than
others to lure them into attending." Id.
94. See Antitrust Agreement Will Not Bring Lower Tuition Rates, Experts in College Financ-
ing Say, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 29, 1991, at A18. William R. Cotter, president of Colby
College, states that "if colleges spent more money on merit-based scholarships-as many expect
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by law, the individual institutions may be forced by competitive pressures to
vie for top students as they grudgingly admit the newly created competitive
necessity of granting scholarships on the basis of merit.9"
Accordingly, agreements to award aid solely on the basis of need, com-
bined with the well-formulated and accurate assessments of need which can
be achieved collectively, are a method of implementing strategies which the
colleges contend falls legitimately within their dominion. 96 The colleges de-
fend the social virtues of their egalitarian goals, maintaining that the past
practices of both Ivy and Overlap agreements have been necessary to the
achievement of these lofty ends.
C. 1. Improvements in Resource Allocation Decisions can be Made
Without Incurring Costs Related to Collaboration.
While joint efforts to accurately determine the financial need of individ-
ual students are undoubtedly rational in the economic sense, they are not
the only means of improving the quality of aid offers. When financial aid
officers from different colleges meet and share information, each is likely to
gain a better data base from which to make informed decisions, as well as
previously unconsidered perspectives offered by others. In the same vein,
managers of the big three American automobile manufacturers would real-
ize increments in efficiency by collaborating and agreeing on the optimal
pricing policies for their marketing strategies, given their own complex ar-
ray of statistical information. As our antitrust laws force private business
to find alternate means of rationalizing the pricing mechanism, so they are
they now will do--students who do not receive financial aid would probably face tuition increases.
When you raise tuition for merit awards, then all the other students and their families pay, and
that's not fair." Id.
95. This assertion is supported by the economic literature suggesting that cartelization short
of binding legal contract invariably leads to unilateral cheating, followed by widespread industry
participation in the ostensibly undesirable pricing behavior. It is in this manner that OPEC resolu-
tions to cap oil production among its members so often fail. After the first member cheats, others
follow like dominos. See EDWIN MANSFIELD & NARIMAN BEHRAVESH, ECONOMICS U.S.A. 410
(1986). The authors state that "one firm may be driven to cheating because it hears that another
firm is doing so, with the eventual result that the collusive agreement is torn apart." While the
Ivy League schools operating under express agreements to offer no merit aid were unlikely to risk
their credibility, reputations, and integrity by cheating, they will be more likely to stray from the
"no merit aid" norm if it is merely a tacit value system, rather than a legally and ethically binding
and legitimate agreement.
96. The Overlap Institutions achieved real benefits from collaboration in accurately assessing
need. Institutions can collectively improve their evaluation of commonly held financial informa-
tion, and they can share unilaterally held information which may be gleaned from different appli-
cation forms, telephone interviews, etc., thereby filling gaps of information for some or all
participating institutions. See Dodge, supra note 93, at A33.
1992]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
justified in forcing colleges to do so in a competitive environment.97 Be-
cause the anti-competitive market effects of price fixing are considered to
outweigh gains in efficiency and quality of information,9" these institutions
must find other means of improving the quality of their decisions-means
that are less intrusive upon the delicately balanced competitive nature of an
otherwise relatively unregulated capitalist economy. Such means might in-
clude enlarged and improved data bases, more elaborately structured finan-
cial aid forms, use of telephone interviews to obtain explanatory
information, continuing education programs for and improved training of
financial aid personnel, and more clearly defined, well-informed policies for
the interpretation of information best aimed at successfully implementing
the strategies of the individual institutions.99
Among these alternatives, all of which are means of rationalizing the
aid-awarding process in a manner less restrictive to competition among
Overlap members, is the potential for members to share data without
resorting to actual price fixing. If the aim of collaboration is to improve the
information base upon which decisions are made, the creation of a mutual
financial data base achieves the goal without fettering the marketplace with
unnecessary collaboration on the actual aid offers themselves."°°
Opponents of collaboration also reject the premise that potentially in-
flated aid offers based on unilateral miscalculation of need will necessarily
reduce the offers made to candidates whose offers leave them at a financial
97. Notwithstanding reduced scrutiny of antitrust violations during the Reagan era, Presi-
dent Bush appears to support a meaningful antitrust policy both at home and abroad. See Ernest
Gellhorn & Kathryn M. Fenton, Vertical Restraints During the Reagan Administration: A Pro-
gram in Search of a Policy, 1988 ANTrrRusT BULL. 543 (1988). While critics view some antitrust
laws as potential impediments to industrial collaboration, innovation and efficiency, most agree
that price fixing behavior bears little or no benefit to outweigh its anti-competitive effects. See
David B. Audretsch, Divergent Views in Antitrust Economics, 1988 ANTITRUST BULL. 135, 146
(1988) (stating that section 1 of the Sherman Act is probably the least controversial of the anti-
trust laws). Under this line of reasoning, colleges and businesses alike should be required to ra-
tionalize their operations without resort to price fixing behavior.
98. See supra note 33.
99. Theoreticians such as Michael Porter support the role of antitrust laws in the mainte-
nance of healthy competitive environments. See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETI-
TIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990). Applying Porter's theories to the administration of
colleges, subjecting financial aid officers to the rigors of antitrust regulations will act as an impetus
to innovation and the development of creative solutions which strengthen, rather than weaken, the
industry.
100. This less restrictive means of rationalizing financial need analysis is more likely to be
considered reasonable than past price fixing behavior, and would avoid the potential per se scru-
tiny of price fixing behavior. The degree of express and implied collaboration would need to be
monitored to ensure that the shared data base does not become a shrouded or implicit price fixing
mechanism through the use of disguised collaborative approaches to analyzing identical data,
aimed at indirectly fixing awards.
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margin. According to Robert Bloch, the harm-at-the-margins argument
'"wrongly assumes that a school's financial aid budget is fixed. Though aid
budgets may be limited at some point, they are not fixed at current
levels."1 ° Bloch's assertion, technically value-free, is factually correct.
Colleges regularly make strategic budgeting decisions in which resources
are shifted from ends such as libraries, facilities, and faculty salaries, as well
as student financial aid. If, upon cessation of collaboration, a college finds
itself unable or unwilling to mitigate losses in accuracy of needs calculation,
it retains the option to shift more funds to student aid in order to maintain
sufficient resources to meet the needs of marginal applicants.10 2 This option
also exists to counter the reduction of need-based funds which might occur
if Overlap institutions were to bid on the basis of merit. Institutions con-
tending that the prospect of such bidding would impair their strategic goal
of universal access fail to recognize that their options are not closed simply
because collusion is prohibited. Rather, the options must be exercised
within a competitive marketplace, in which implementation of strategy is
not free.
A college can unilaterally decide to offer aid solely on the basis of need,
in essence refusing to participate in competitive bidding based on merit.103
This decision of course bears a cost as the institution loses potentially tal-
ented students lured by the competitive bidding of other schools. Likewise,
a college can decide that it will commit itself unilaterally to compete by
granting merit scholarships and to award all students aid which fully meets
need. This decision bears the cost of shifting resources from another part of
the budget to increase the overall pool of aid money.
Given these real but costly options, the position of the Overlap Group is
based on the implicit assumption that colleges should not have to bear any
costs of competition in pursuing their strategic goals. This argument might
be more palatable if there were no benefit to be gained from price competi-
101. See supra note 26.
102. While businesses regularly face the painful necessity of cutting budgets and shifting re-
sources as a fact of life, there is implicit in the arguments of Overlap supporters a denial that there
should be opportunity costs in academic strategic decision-making.
103. The Justice Department's position regarding needs-based financial aid has been consis-
tent throughout its investigation and initiation of prosecution. According to James Rill, Assistant
Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, the Justice Department and the complaint
do not preclude a college defendant from unilaterally establishing aid based on need. What
the complaint and the relief prohibits [sic] among other things is a collusive establishment
of a policy that aid will be based only on need, and in addition, prohibits [sic] the establish-
ment of a uniform formula and prohibits [sic] the meetings in which individual students
were discussed.
See supra note 14.
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tion among colleges. Yet such competition would benefit students with
need by increasing individual aid offers as well as total aid pools. Moreover,
by freeing individual schools to court students with scholarships based on
merit, the ban against exclusively need-formulated, collusive aid allows stu-
dents to sell their talents to the Overlap institutions. Finally, just as price
competition forces private businesses to operate lean and reduce waste, the
end of price collusion is likely to render colleges more efficient in their
operations.
V. HIGHER EDUCATION AS BIG BUSINESS
As noted earlier, there remains some ambiguity in the law regarding the
appropriate treatment of learned professions under the Sherman Act's pro-
visions. "0 Uncertainty surrounds two vital questions pertinent to the Over-
lap Group case: whether to apply the per se rule, the Rule of Reason, or
some hybrid thereof, and whether these approaches are actually as distinc-
tive in practice as they are in theory.
The arguments that follow suggest that higher education bears signifi-
cant characteristics of profit-oriented businesses. These similarities between
colleges and corporations support the application of per se analysis, or al-
ternatively, a qualified per se analysis which requires use of the least restric-
tive alternative to address legitimate goals.105 While a reduced or relaxed
scrutiny of anti-competitive behavior among educational institutions may
be appropriate regarding purely academic questions, heightened scrutiny
should apply to policies which directly affect pricing through the establish-
ment of uniform aid offers.' 0 6
A professor of economics recently stated that "universities ... are not
profit-maximizing institutions and hence are not subject to market pres-
sures."10' 7 This is implicitly or explicitly the line of reasoning behind the
notion that colleges are not bound by the Sherman Act and the movement
encouraging Congress to exempt them if they are so bound.108 The state-
ment's validity rests on the proposition that only profit-seeking organiza-
tions are affected by supply and demand. If this underlying presumption
were true, application of antitrust laws to the Overlap Group would be eco-
nomically irrational, serving to fetter the members' ability to gain benefits
104. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
106. See Majorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secon-
dary Schls., Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
107. David Colander, Economists Don't Teach Students What They Need to Know, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 13, 1991, at A52.
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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from collaboration while accomplishing no valid competitive function. If,
however, colleges are affected by market forces despite their not-for-profit
status, regulation prohibiting anti-competitive behavior serves a rational
purpose. To the extent that these institutions compete and are forced to
jockey for position aggressively, the temptation they face to tamper with
market forces increases, and the need for substantial enforcement of anti-
trust laws grows. 10 9
The dynamics of higher education in the 1980s and 1990s reflect a cli-
mate of intense competition that rivals private industry, notwithstanding
the technically not-for-profit status of the institutions themselves. This phe-
nomenon is a function of two interacting forces that are discussed in the
remainder of this section.
A. Competition for Institutional Resources Reflects the Extent to Which
These Resources Enhance the Lives of the Faculty and Administrators
Who Seek Them.
Healthy budgets confer innumerable benefits directly upon administra-
tors and faculty who control tuition and financial aid decision-making
processes. Wealthy colleges can pay higher salaries, grant generous and
frequent sabbatical leaves, provide a high level of research support, and
maintain liberal pools of travel funds, all of which help promote the pres-
tige, honor, and external consulting opportunities that are important to
many academics.' 10
Critics have recently condemned professors for engaging in opportunis-
tic, self-aggrandizing behavior which ostensibly exploits lavish resources at
the expense of teaching and other forms of service to students."'1 The accu-
sations of these critics are as often justified as they are grossly unfair, as the
109. For a discussion of the nature of intra-industry competition and jockeying for position,
see generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY (1980).
110. Even among the very wealthiest institutions, disparities of endowment are dramatic.
For example, in 1990, the five best endowed universities spanned the following range of endow-
ments: Harvard, $4,653,229,000; University of Texas System, $3,256,192,000; Yale,
$2,570,892,000; Princeton, $2,527,140,000; and Stanford, $2,053,128,000. The twentieth wealthi-
est university, Johns Hopkins, had an endowment in 1990 of $560,478,000. See College & Univer-
sity Enrollments over $60-million, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. ALMANAC, Aug. 28, 1991, at 36.
Although absolute endowment figures must be tempered by enrollment figures reflecting the ex-
tent to which the dollars must be stretched, colleges operate under conditions of enormous fiscal
inequality. The pressures they face to compete under these circumstances are reflected in both the
rapid increase of tuition and the resources dedicated to ambitious fund-raising drives.
111. See CHARLES J. SYKES, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER EDU-
CATION 33-77 (1988) (discussing the "flight from teaching," by which Sykes refers to the reduc-
tion in teaching responsibilities in favor of research and increased activity external to the
university, often for additional emolument); see also ROGER KIMBALL, TENURED RADICALS:
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faculty at a college, like the personnel at any profit-oriented corporation,
includes selfish, selfless, and hybrid personalities. While generalizations in
regard to faculty behavior may condemn the good with the bad, they have
served to highlight two points crucial to the applicability of antitrust laws
to higher education: there are enormously compelling stakes within reach
of academic decision makers, stakes which should be expected to tempt at
least some to indulge in anti-competitive behavior; and professors, who are
as fallible as managers, officers, and directors of businesses, will at times
succumb to the temptation. For these reasons, it is unrealistic to suggest
that colleges should be immune from antitrust regulation because they tech-
nically seek no profits.
B. Tuition Dollars Contribute Significantly to the Institutional Resources
at Private Colleges.
Compared to state colleges which receive much of their funding from
state sources, private colleges make up a greater proportion of their budgets
from the tuition they charge to students. For this reason, tuition has a
greater impact on professorial and administrative resources at private col-
leges than at public colleges. While qualitative, noneconomic motives for
removing price from student consideration should be identical for all col-
leges, private or public, the economic motives for eliminating price consid-
eration apply disproportionately to private colleges.
If the purpose of the Overlap Group's activities were legitimately quali-
tative, we would expect to see an analogous movement in the public college
sector. Yet prestigious state institutions have not attempted to collaborate
in the manner of the Overlap group. Schools like the "Public Ivys,"'' 12
while natural leaders in seeking access to higher education by their very
missions and temperaments, have not sought to coordinate financial aid of-
fers among themselves in order to remove the consideration of cost from the
college selection question. Innumerable explanations may account for this
fact, including the notion that public institutions are not presented with an
How POLITICS HAS CORRUPTED OUR HIGHER EDUCATION (1990) (addressing the effect of ten-
ured professorial power on the curriculum and the operation of the university).
112. See RICHARD MOLL, THE PUBLIC Ivys: A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S BEST PUBLIC UN-
DERGRADUATE COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1985). According to Moll, the Public Ivys con-
sist of the University of California, Miami University of Ohio, the University of Michigan, the
University of North Carolina, the University of Texas, the University of Vermont, the University
of Virginia, and the William and Mary College. "The best of the rest" includes the University of
Colorado, Georgia Institute of Technology, the University of Illinois, New College of the Univer-
sity of South Florida, Pennsylvania State University, the University of Pittsburgh, the State Uni-
versity of New York at Binghamton, the University of Washington, and the University of
Wisconsin.
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adequate self-serving incentive to engage in price fixing, given the costs and
risks involved and the relatively minor role of tuition in terms of total
budget dollars. Conversely, policy makers at private colleges, who are theo-
retically no more concerned with access to education than their public-col-
lege counterparts, have greater incentive to hinder price competition,
thereby increasing the total tuition revenues that play so vital a role in
maintaining a high quality of support for their work.
Proposition A suggests that colleges, while technically not-for-profit,
deal in high stakes that are considered very valuable to members of their
decision-making communities. Proposition B suggests that private colleges
receive potentially greater economic gains from price fixing than public col-
leges, while both groups benefit equally when students and institutions are
matched on the basis of noneconomic factors. The fact that private colleges
have engaged in collaborative activity for which there is no public college
analogue suggests that either (i) they are engaging in anti-competitive
rather than strategic, qualitative behavior that relates to their missions and
objectives, or (ii) they have and will continue to have much motivation and
temptation to do so. Under either scenario, arguments to the effect that
private colleges are not in business and therefore should be treated with
special consideration appear feeble.
These dynamics explain why the technicality of not-for-profit status is
largely irrelevant to the existence of institutional temptation to behave op-
portunistically, including the temptation to interfere with healthy free-mar-
ket functioning, in an effort to control the pricing mechanism. Just as
managers of corporations have been observed to act for their own individual
interests at the expense of the welfare of shareholders," 3 the administrative
and academic decision makers at colleges also have plenty of competitive
(or, unfortunately, anti-competitive) incentives. As the existence of profit-
seeking shareholders has become largely irrelevant in motivating manage-
rial behavior, 1 4 the economic distinction between corporations and colleges
has blurred-both are run by human beings who are naturally self-inter-
ested. Because the stakes in both arenas are high enough to encourage anti-
113. Myles Mace has documented the opportunistic behavior of directors of corporations.
See generally MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1986).
114. The irrelevance of shareholders, and hence the mitigation of the profit motive as a driv-
ing force in managerial decision making, has been documented since the early twentieth century.
See generally THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE (1904) (documenting
the separation of ownership and control in business organizations); see also ADOLPH A. BERLE,
JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1934)
(observing the potential for conflicts of interest between owners and managers, and analyzing the
nature of the relationship between shareholders and directors).
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competitive activity, both are legitimately subjected to antitrust scrutiny.
For these reasons, colleges should be treated like the profit-oriented busi-
nesses they have come to resemble in terms of the economic factors which
motivate their leaders.115
VI. CONCLUSION
The past practices of the Overlap Group violate section 1 of the Sher-
man Act under either per se or Rule of Reason analysis. Under the decision
in Board of Trade, price fixing is per se a violation of the Act." 6 Behavior
which sets uniform prices among twenty-three institutions clearly falls
within this rule. Arguments to the effect that institutions of higher educa-
tion should be evaluated using a more lenient standard, such as a qualified
per se or a Rule of Reason approach, all depend upon a finding that the
practices in question comprise professional behavior" 7 of a noncommercial
nature."" Because tuition revenues are in fact a compelling commercial
element of higher education that students face, as documented in Sections
IV and V, a reduced level of scrutiny cannot be justified.
Were a court, notwithstanding these arguments, to apply a Rule of Rea-
son analysis, the behavior of the Overlap Group would still comprise a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. Under the Rule of Reason, behavior that would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws may be allowed if it can be shown to
have an essentially procompetitive effect.I 9 While the colleges can and do
make claims which suggest rational bases for collaborating on financial aid
offers, these goals consistently fall outside the realm of competition induce-
ment. Although objectives such as equal access and choice based on quali-
ties may be laudable, they confer no positive effect on competition sufficient
to counter the anti-competitive nature of the price-fixing behavior. As a
result, the benefits obtained from Overlap Group collaboration cannot be
characterized as procompetitive, and fail to meet even the reduced thresh-
old of the Rule of Reason.
115. Apart from the incentives for decision makers to act opportunistically, budgets and re-
sources of universities are enormous, reflecting a parity between the power of these institutions
and the power of corporations. For example, in 1989, the range of total research and development
spending at the sixty top institutions based on expenditure extended from $648,395,000 at Johns
Hopkins University to $82,914,000 at Princeton University. CHRON. HIGHER EDUc. ALMANAC,
Aug. 28, 1991, at 37.
116. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
117. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
118. See Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)
119. See Richmonds supra note 55.
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Should college administrators petition Congress for a revision of the
laws allowing resumption of Overlap Group collaboration, the policy con-
siderations discussed herein suggest that the petition should be denied.
Higher education has grown in size, resources, and power to such an extent
that little justification remains for carving an exception which would distin-
guish it from corporate America in general. Because administrators and
professors face significant incentives to engage in anti-competitive behavior,
the law should continue to prohibit price-fixing activity as it does in other
sectors.

